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Latin America is commonly perceived as lagging behind the United
States and other First World entities, in terms of making the successful tran-
sition to a fully functioning democracy. That is not to say that by and large
the countries of Latin America have not struggled to embody democratic
ideals since their inception.' After nearly two hundred years of independ-
ence, all the countries of Latin America, except Cuba, have some form of
democratically elected government.' Despite sustained efforts towards de-
mocracy, however, there is a continuing disparity between democratic ideals
and the reality of day-to-day governance.'
The judiciary plays a unique and important role in democratization at-
tempts. An independent judiciary is able to protect against the "arbitrary ex-
ercise of government power."4 Typically, the judiciary is responsible for pro-
tecting the constitution and the rights of individuals under the constitution,
as well as guarding against human rights violations.'
Additionally, a functioning judiciary that applies the law in a fair, quick,
and efficient manner is necessary for economic development. This presents a
unique difficulty for developing nations, in that these nations stand to benefit
the most from foreign investment, but may have the most difficulty provid-
ing an appropriate judicial forum to promote such investment.
This Comment will examine the most recent judicial reforms affected in
Costa Rica. A summary of the legal and judicial development of Latin
America generally, and of Costa Rica specifically will be presented in Part I.
A rudimentary understanding of the history of judicial development is neces-
sary in order to place the current problems and proposed solutions into con-
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1. See John Linarelli, Anglo-American Jurisprudence and Latin America, 20 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 50, 51-52 (1996) (indicating that the constitutions of many Latin American Coun-
tries, including Costa Rica, contain lofty guarantees intended to protect individual freedoms
and ensure a vibrant democracy).
2. Id.
3. ld. at 51.
4. Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical
and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. Comp. L. 605, 606 (1996).
5. Id.
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text. The attitude of Latin America, and of Costa Rica, towards the judiciary
derives from its evolution from colonial subjects to independent democra-
cies. Costa Rica's success with reform efforts can be attributed to several
factors, including Costa Rica's unique historical development and the strong
impetus for reform within the judiciary itself. Part II will describe some of
the problems confronting Latin American judiciaries generally, and discuss
how Costa Rica has dealt with these challenges. Costa Rica has had a meas-
ure of success in establishing a functioning judiciary while other Latin
American countries have failed in similar attempts.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SPANISH LAW
Much of Latin America's legal history derives either directly or indi-
rectly from the conquest and subsequent colonial administration of the re-
gion by the Spanish. The colonies were completely subjugated to the will of
the Sovereign. Latin America was
[T]reated as the direct and exclusive possession of the crown.... The king
possessed not only the sovereign rights but the property rights; he was the
absolute proprietor, the sole political head, of his American dominions.
Every privilege and position, economic, political, or religious, came from
him.
The Colonies were ruled by the will of the King, and the law of the
colonies derived from attempts to unify the law of Spain.
Spanish law can be traced back to Roman law, which was introduced
into Spain as early as 250 B.C., when Rome conquered the Iberian Penin-
sula.7 Although Roman Law became the official law of the peninsula, local
Celto-Iberian customary law continued to play an important part in private
transactions.
[T]here is evidence of the continued vigour of native legal concepts at
variance with those of Roman.... The impression remains that, during
Spain's Roman period, Roman private law was the "official law," but that
de jure by the measure of its recognition of native law, and de facto, by
the tenacity with which the population clung to its traditional usages, the
importance of the old customary law remained.8
The first Roman Code dates back to approximately 450 B.C., when a
crude compilation of customary law and legislation was collected in the
6. KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
34 (1975) (quoting CLARENCE H. HARING, THE SPANISH EMPIRE IN AMERICA 5 (Harbinger ed.,
1963)).
7. Id. at 20.
8. Id. (quoting EELCO N. VAN KLEFFEENS, HISPANIC LAW UNTIL THE END OF THE MIDDLE
AGES 39-40 (1968)).
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Twelve Tables.' Subsequently, efforts to organize the law resulted in several
different legal collections, ° the most notable of which was the Corpus Juris
Civilis of Justinian."
After 650 years of Roman rule, Roman law was not displaced when
Germanic tribes and the Visigoths conquered Spain.12 Instead, conquest by
the Visigoths actually served to reinforce some aspects of Roman law, since
the Visigoths had incorporated parts of Roman law into their own Gothic
Law.13 The codification of this combination of Gothic law and Roman law
appeared in the Fuero Juzgo 4
Even after the Moors conquered Spain in 710 A.D., the Fuero Juzgo and
Roman law continued to goyern its population."5 The Reconquest of the pen-
insula from the Moorish invaders, however, resulted in a splintering of the
law. This occurred because over the 800-year span of the Reconquest, indi-
vidual kingdoms freed from Moorish rule were granted a unique system of
rights and legal obligations, known asfueros.'6 Each city was governed by its
own set of legal norms as set forth in its particularfuero.
[The fueros] generally set forth detailed rules and privileges for self-
governance of the locale, often codifying local customs. [Fueros] tended
to restrict the king's arbitrary exercise of power by such measures as tax
exemptions or basic guarantees of due process in criminal cases.17
The grant of fueros to each municipality as it was freed from Muslim
rule resulted in a multiplicity of legal norms.
This diversification of legal norms continued until Alfonso the Wise
took steps to unify the kingdom's legal system. 8 In 1255 A.D., Alfonso
promulgated the Feuro Real to replace the individual fueros that had been
granted to cities until that time. 9 Instead of creating a uniquefuero for each
city as it made the transition from Moorish rule to Spanish Rule, Alfonso
used the Feuro Real as a uniform set of legal norms applicable to all locales.
Another important work undertaken by Alfonso the Wise was the Siete
Partidas.2 ' The Siete Partidas derived both from the custom of the
Gothic/Roman inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula and from Roman
9. Id. at 13.
10. See id. at 14-15 (e.g., Institutes of Gaius).
11. Id. at 15.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 20.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id. at 23.
17. Id. at 24.
18. Id. at 25.
19. ALBERT S. GOLBERT & YENNY NUN, LATIN AMERICAN LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS 2
(1982).
20. Id.
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Sources.21 The Siete Partidas demonstrate the return to original Roman codi-
fications of law. Much of the third and fifth sections of the Siete Partidas
were nearly exact copies of Justinian's Corpus Juris.22
Alfonso's attempts to unify the legal system of the peninsula met stout
resistance. There was a strong preference for the local custom and individu-
alized municipal rights granted under the fueros.23 Municipalities were reluc-
tant to sacrifice the peculiar rights guaranteed in the individual fueros for the
unity that the Fuero Real offered. Although the difficulty of unifying the di-
verse legal interests of the fueros persisted in Spain, no such difficulty arose
when imposing a unified system of legal norms in the colonies."
A. Spanish Law in the Americas
The Crown had absolute power over the colonies in the Americas, and
insisted on controlling every aspect of administration. The Council of the In-
dies was created in order to facilitate the regulation of the colonies." The
council regulated all aspects of colonial life by serving as "an administrative
board, legislative branch, and an appeals court all at the same time." '26 The
council served as the "ultimate judicial authority" for the colonies. 7
The decisions of the crown and the council were implemented in the
new world by audiencias.28 These regional institutions protected the crown's
interests by "reviewing the acts of the royal officers ... ."29 The audiencias
provided greater access to judicial services for the colonists, and served to
check the powers of the colonial governors.3"
Local municipalities were administered by alcaldes who were chosen
through a combined system of elections and appointment." In some in-
stances indigenous judges were chosen as a means to introduce Spanish law
to the indigenous populations.32 The alcaldes' decisions were subject to re-
view by the audiencias.3 3 This colonial governance structure left little to no
room for the development of means for local control. Each level of govern-
ance was subject to levels of review because self-governance was not con-
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id at 33.
25. Luz Estella Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin America,
30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 345, 349 (2000).
26. Id. at 349.
27. Felipe Saez Garcia, The Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America and some Stra-
tegic Considerations, 13 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 1267, 1276 (1998).
28. Nagle, supra note 25, at 350.
29. Id. at 350.
30. Garcia, supra note 27, at 1276.
31. Id. See also Nagle, supra note 25, at 350.
32. Garcia, supra note 27, at 1277.
33. Nagle, supra note 25, at 350.
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sidered to further the interests of the king.
The bureaucracy created for the administration of the colonies made it
difficult for those living in the colonies to comply with the letter of the law
and accomplish anything. The system "derived from a deep distrust by the
Crown of colonial officials. ' 34 It was designed to promote the interests of the
Crown, and was structured to prevent the accumulation of prestige or power
in the colonies rather than for their efficient administration.35 An interesting
dichotomy developed which allowed the colonists to deal with their day-to-
day business despite the oppressive bureaucracy and regulation.
Colonists recognized the value and importance of the law in theory, but
they took a very practical approach to its application. They would pay lip
service to the law, but felt no compunction about violating its terms when
necessary. When regulations were "impossible or inconvenient to execute"
they were "shelved with the famous Spanish formula, I obey but do not exe-
cute, and were referred back to Spain again for further consideration."36 It
was a very pragmatic response, which allowed colonists to honor the law in
theory, but avoid its restrictions in application. To some extent that same di-
chotomy exists in Latin America still; Latin Americans can ignore the law
on one hand, while on the other they "possess a basic faith, an idealistic be-
lief in the legislative paradigm, that legislation can solve all problems."37
B. Colonial Costa Rica
Costa Rica's colonial experience was, in many ways, unique from that
of its neighbors in Central America. These distinctive historical develop-
ments provide a framework that has facilitated contemporary rule of law re-
forms. Although Columbus landed on the coast of Costa Rica on his fourth
voyage in 1502,38 colonization of Costa Rica's interior was delayed sixty
years due to difficulties caused by the weather, landscape and dense forests.39
When settlement did proceed to Costa Rica's interior, it presented a
unique set of circumstances. While most Spanish colonies forced the indige-
nous populations to work as serfs"° the native population in Costa Rica
found refuge in the forests.41 Without feudal labor, the Spanish colonists
were forced to work the land on their own."2 This emphasis on individual
farming activities, coupled with the absence of mineral resources, caused the
34. Garcia, supra note 27, at 1277.
35. Id. at 1277-78.
36. Id. at 1278-79.
37. Linarelli, supra note 1, at 59.
38. RICHARDBIESANZETAL., THE COSTA RICANS 15 (1982).
39. Id.
40. Indians were required to provide labor or pay taxes, in exchange for which the colo-
nists agreed to "protect and Christianize them." id. at 17.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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focus of development in the region to be on individual landowners. 3 Conse-
quently a strong sense of individualism became part of Costa Rica's national
identity. The development of individual farms in the region has been de-
scribed as:
[A] small world in which the family was born and raised, far from other
farms. Their simple life, without ambitions or desires, gave the inhabitants
a rude, mistrustful, very individualistic character. They were without
exception peasants who had to till the soil for their food; as a result Costa
Rica became a rural democracy. Unlike other Spanish colonies, Costa Rica
had no social classes or castes, no despotic functionaries who looked down
on others, no powerful creoles owning land and slaves and hating the
Spaniards, no oppressed mestizo class resentful of the maltreatment and
scorn of the creoles."
While this characterization of Costa Rica as an egalitarian, classless so-
ciety has been seen by some as more an ideal than a reality due to the wealth
and power that resulted from the development of the coffee and banana in-
dustries in Costa Rica,4 its important effect is in how Costa Ricans perceive
themselves.
The Colonial mode of governance continued in Latin America, includ-
ing Costa Rica, until Napoleon seized Spain in 1808. Many of the Creole
elite in Latin America began contemplating independence at about that time.
By 1822, most of the Latin American countries had attained independence. '
Even so, many Costa Ricans were surprised when Guatemala declared the
independence of all Latin America. '
The American and French Constitutions both influenced the new nations
in Latin America as they drafted their own constitutions. ' Further, the new
nations drew inspiration for their own legal codes from the French Civil
Code enacted in 1804.49
C. Costa Rica After Independence
As other nations in Latin America declared independence, Costa Rica
followed suit."0 Independence from Spain was not declared at a national
level; rather each town met and declared its own independence from Spain in
1821." Over the next thirty years a gradual shift from localized independ-
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 20.
46. KARST, supra note 6, at 42.
47. BIESANZ, supra note 38, at 18.
48. KARST, supra note 6, at 45.
49. Id. at 44.
50. BIESANZ, supra note 38, at 18.
51. Id.
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ence towards a sense of nationalism developed.52 This development culmi-
nated in 1856, when people from all parts of Costa Rican society responded
to repel an army that had crossed the border from Nicaragua.53 This collec-
tive effort helped Costa Ricans feel "a sense of nationalism transcending old
localist interests and grudges."'
During the latter half of the 1800s, those who had become wealthy by
growing and exporting coffee dominated the political scene and struggled
among themselves for political power.55 In 1871, Colonel Tomds Guardia
took control of the government in a coup.56 Until his death in 1882, Guardia
limited the power of the coffee growing elite.57
During Guardia's dictatorship, a group of men known as the "generation
of 1889" met to discuss liberal ideas, and upon Guardia's death, began im-
plementing some of these ideas." For example, in order to separate church
and state, schools and cemeteries were secularized, and the Jesuits were ex-
pelled from the country.59 The expulsion of the Jesuits is still seen by some
as the reason that Costa Rica has escaped the difficulties experienced by
other nations in the region in separating church and state.' The legitimacy of
the government is reinforced by its independence from religion, and that le-
gitimacy in turn allows the government to make meaningful judicial reform
with greater ease.
Another important development in Costa Rica during that period was
the emergence of a free press.61 Increasingly, the public had access to infor-
mation and ideas that permitted them to participate in the democratic proc-
ess.62 This tradition of free press is important because in contemporary soci-
ety, "free and effective media are needed for constituencies to build their
base of support and to generate public pressure for legal reform."63 The press
not only promotes transparency in the judiciary by making it accountable to
the public, it also provides the public with information about efforts at judi-
cial reform.
52. Id. at 20.
53. Id. at 19-20.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 21.
59. Id.
60. Juan Diego Castro, President of the Costa Rican Bar Association, Videotape: Inter-
views with Proyecto Acceso (McGill Center for Creative Problem Solving 2000) (on file with
the McGill Center for Creative Problem Solving at California Western School of Law).
61. BIESANZ, supra note 38, at 21.
62. Id.
63. Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America,
36 VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 227 (1995) (quoting Harry Blair & Gary Hansen, United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) Program and Operations Assessment Report
No. 7, Weighing in on the Scales of Justice: Strategic Approaches for Donor Supported Rule
of Law Programs 24 (1994)).
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During this period elections were held without being influenced by the
government for the first time." Costa Ricans had long participated in the
electoral process, but the government had always influenced the elections
prior to 1889. During the elections that year, the president tried to impose his
own candidate, but his candidate was forced to withdraw by an organized
march against the action.65 Since that time elections have been fairly impar-
tial, with one exception.
During the first half of the twentieth century, Costa Rica's government
continued to develop in the face of two world wars and another brief period
of dictatorial rule."6 In 1940, President Rafael Calder6n enacted a "radical
social welfare system"67 that set the stage for the civil war of 1948. The con-
flict itself was set in motion when the Electoral Tribunal indicated that one
candidate had the lead in the presidential election, but the Costa Rican Con-
gress announced its intention to annul the election and place another candi-
date in the presidency despite the election results. 68 Supporters of the candi-
date who appeared to have won the vote rightfully attacked several strategic
outlying positions in the country, and began a march on the capital city. 9 Af-
ter a month, the two sides ended the conflict by signing a treaty agreement
that placed Jos6 Figueres, the leader of the rebellion, in power for eighteen
months, after which Otilio Ulate, the candidate who had won the election,
would become president." During Figueres' eighteen-month tenure, the mili-
tary was disbanded, the banks and insurance companies were nationalized,
the utilities were taken over, and a new constitution was ratified.71 Pursuant
to the terms of the agreement that had ended the civil war, Ulate peacefully
took control of the government on November 9, 1949.72 The violent conflict
resulted in
A rededication to the maintenance of civil government, the peaceful trans-
fer of power from one popularly elected candidate to another, and a per-
fecting of the electoral process.... The bitterness engendered by the
whole process of the revolution proved anew to the Costa Rican people
that, even though representative government can be slow and at times un-
responsive, it is an effective safeguard against government excess. 73
Since that time elections have been free of the governmental tinkering
64. BIESANZ, supra note 38, at 21.
65. Id.
66. Federico Tinoco took power in a coup early in 1917 and remained in control until
August 9, 1918. Id. at 23.
67. JUAN CARLOS ZARATE, FORGING DEMOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
EFFECTS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ON CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATIZATION 40 (1994).
68. BIESANZ, supra note 38, at 26.
69. Id. at 27.
70. Id. at 27.
71. ZARATE, supra note 67, at 44.
72. BIESANZ, supra note 38, at 28.
73. Id. at 29 (quoting JOHN PATRICK BELL, CRISIS IN COSTA RICA 161 (1971)).
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that had been prevalent in Costa Rican elections.74 The successful, peaceful
transfer of power after the civil war helped reinvigorate the electoral process
in Costa Rica, and resulted in the development of strong executive and legis-
lative branches, but the judiciary had difficulty establishing its place within
the government. The stability of Costa Rica's government provides a
framework within which it is possible to attempt reform. Other Latin Ameri-
can nations lack fundamental stability in other parts of their governments,
which makes it more difficult to make meaningful judicial reform.
II. COMMON DIFFICULTIES FACED BY LATIN AMERICAN JUDICIARIES
There are several general deficiencies within Latin American Judiciar-
ies. First, oftentimes they fail to reflect the social realities of the people."
The codes enacted are abstract and are difficult to apply in reality. Second,
the legislature and judiciary are typically weak vis a vis the executive
branch.76 The judiciary often lacks the stature and power to act as an effec-
tive check on the legislative or the executive branches. Third, there is a dis-
turbing lack of independence in the judiciary. 7 The judiciary has difficulty
acting as an independent, objective third party when deciding cases; it lacks
the resources to effectively enforce the laws and it is relegated to a subservi-
ent position to the other stronger branches of government. Fourth, there is a
lack of transparency in judicial process. Without the scrutiny of observers,
it is easy for the judiciary to deviate from its ethical responsibilities when
deciding a case. Fifth, corruption has plagued Latin American judiciaries."
And finally, a variety of obstacles prevent access to justice."0
A. Increasing Pressure to Make Meaningful Judicial Reform
1. Economic Incentives for Judicial Reform
In recent years there has been an increase in the amount of international
74. Id. at 28.
75. Linarelli, supra note 1, at 52.
76. Id. at 63. See also Nagle, supra note 25, at 358-60; Dawn Bennet-Ingold, Latin
American Democracy: Flourishing or Floundering?, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 111, 139
(1999).
77. Dakolias, supra note 63, at 173-74. See Nagle, supra note 25, at 356.
78. Id. at 197. See Joseph R. Thome, Heading South But Looking North: Globalization
and Law Reform in Latin America, 2000 WIs. L. REV. 691, 702-03 (2000).
79. Nagle, supra note 25, at 360. See generally Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attack-
ing Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical Process in Judicial Reform, 18 WIS. INT'L L. J.
353 (2000).
80. Dakolias, supra note 63, at 199-217. Some obstacles that prevent access to the judi-
ciary include the cost of participating in the legal process, a lack of information regarding in-
dividual rights and the procedural steps of the process; and a lack of confidence in the system
itself. "In other words, a judicial system may present economic, psychological, informational
and physical barriers for individuals who need its services." Id. at 139.
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trade. It has become more difficult for individual nations to remain isolated.
It is generally agreed that there is an "intimate link between the climate of
social certainty which the rule of law can provide and long-term economic
growth."8 A dependable judiciary has become "a basic condition for mem-
bership in the global economy."8 Participation in the international market
depends upon the environment created by the rule of law.
The global community requires that a certain level of trade exist be-
tween nations.
In a global economy, the role of law as an element of rationality, calcula-
bility, and coordination becomes fundamental. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that a permanent tension exists between the market forces and the at-
tempts to introduce normative and institutional elements that allow us to
stabilize exchanges and to make them foreseeable. It is quite evident that
traditional domestic regulation will be largely ineffective and that global,
or more frequently, regional arrangements are needed to cope with the le-
gal challenges posed by the new world economic order."
Law must provide predictability and stability for successful economic
development in the international community.
Members of the World Bank have emphasized the importance of pre-
dictability:
The rule of law is a precondition for sectoral development. It creates cer-
tainty and predictability; it leads to lower transactions costs, greater access
to capital and the establishment of level playing fields.... Of particular
importance is good governance to establish an appropriate legal and regu-
latory framework and maintain competent and honest civil service and ju-
dicial institutions.
84
In order to sustain economic growth and benefit from foreign invest-
ment, the judiciary must enforce objective rules that have been adopted in
response to the genuine needs of the people. The judiciary must consist of
"well-functioning institutions that operate in a transparent way and are ac-
countable to citizens."' One commentator has stated: "A free and robust
market can thrive only in a political system where individual freedoms and
property rights are accorded respect and where redress for violations of such
rights can be found in fair and equitable courts. ' 6
81. Hector Fix-Fierro & Sergio Lopez-Ayllon, The Impact of Globalization on the Re-
form of the State and the Law in Latin America, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 785, 796 (1997).
82. Thome, supra note 78, at 697.
83. Fix-Fierro & Lopez-Ayllon, supra note 81, at 792-93.
84. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Framework for Development: The World Bank's Role in
Legal and Judicial Reform, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 13,
13 (Malcolm Rowat et al. eds., 1995).
85. Id.
86. Dakolias, supra note 63, at 167.
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2. Democratic Incentives for Judicial Reform
A functioning judiciary is essential not only to economic development,
but also to democratic development. In many instances the judiciary is
charged by a nation's constitution with the protection of its citizens' rights.
"A strong judiciary bringing about 'an enforceable, compulsory, and fore-
seeable rule of law' is an essential foundation for a strong democracy."87 In
Latin America however, there has been a strong tradition for the judiciary to
defer to the legislative and executive branches of government.88 Indeed, de-
spite fascinations with the legislative codification of law, legislatures have
traditionally been weak, deferring to the will of an exceptionally strong ex-
ecutive. This created a situation in which the executive overpowered the
other two branches of government.89 The executive was therefore in a posi-
tion to abuse its power without any sort of limiting influence by the other
two branches. When there is such a consolidation of power without checks,
there is the opportunity for extra-constitutional abuses. Costa Rican jurists
claim that judicial inactions resulted in "the 'tyranny of the law' that
amounted to 170 years of disrespect for the constitution." 90
It is important to recognize that a well functioning judiciary is only one
element needed for the establishment of the rule of law. As Thomas Caroth-
ers stated:
Effective, efficient administration of justice is a part of the rule of law, but
not the entirety. Rule of law rests on other important features: laws that are
publicly known, clear and applied equally to everyone; respect for politi-
cal and civil liberties, especially due process in criminal matters; and the
subordination of government power to legal authority. 91
Latin American governments are beginning to acknowledge the impor-
tance of these features and incorporate some of them in their own judiciaries.
B. Costa Rica's Efforts at Judicial Reform
1. Economic Development
Costa Rica is aware of the importance of the judiciary to economic de-
velopment. At the World Bank Conference on Judicial Reform in Latin
87. Dawn Bennet-Ingold, Latin American Democracy: Flourishing or Floundering?, 28
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 111, 139 (1999).
88. Bruce M. Wilson & Roger Handberg, From Judicial Passivity to Judicial Activity:
Explaining the Change within Costa Rica's Supreme Court, 5 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM.
522 (1999).
89. Bennet-Ingold, supra note 87, at 139.
90. Wilson & Handberg, supra note 88, at 534.
91. THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 164
(1999).
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America and the Caribbean, Hernando Paris Rodriguez stated:
An investor contemplating doing business in a country today does not look
only at its economic indicators, communications and transport systems,
taxes, customs, and workforce. Today's investor also asks whether an in-
dependent judiciary exists, whether the rules of the game are maintained
over time or modified at whim, whether the judicial system functions
properly, and whether there are alternative methods for solving disputes.
Without legal safeguards, no investment is forthcoming, and there can be
no development without investment. 92
Economic developments depend on a judiciary that is able to quickly
and fairly administer reliable laws in an evenhanded fashion. In order to se-
cure investment capital sufficient to sustain economic growth the state must
ensure that investors can seek protection from the law.93
While a functioning judiciary is essential to economic growth, it is im-
portant to remember that:
[B]usiness people dislike litigation-no matter the country. It is a slow,
inefficient mechanism to resolve disputes. During a period of legal reform
new laws are designed to facilitate open markets, provide against dis-
crimination of goods and services from trade partners, and enshrine inves-
tor protection. There is also an opportunity to inject more efficient forms
of conflict resolution that benefit capital flows and reduce transaction
costs. The smooth functioning of international investment is of primary in-
terest to business partners and financial institutions from the developed
world.94
Even in a country where a judiciary is considered to function efficiently
enough for investors to rely on, there is a strong desire to avoid its use. Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) includes mechanisms designed to allow
parties to reach an amenable solution without recourse to the judicial system.
It has been popular for transnational corporations, who do not trust the judi-
ciary in foreign lands, to use ADR rather than rely on a judiciary that is
viewed as corrupt.95
While Latin America has been part of the ADR experience for years,
"the inclusion of ADR as an explicit tool of international development pro-
grams, especially judicial reforms, is a relatively new phenomenon."96 Spe-
cific methods encompassed by the broad term ADR include "[A]rbitration,
mediation, conciliation and, in some instances, decisions of justices of the
92. Hernando Paris Rodriguez, Improving the Administration of Justice in Costa Rica, in
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 199, 200 (Malcolm Rowat et al.
eds., 1995).
93. Thome, supra note 78, at 699.
94. James Cooper, Essay: Access to Justice 1.1, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 429, 432 (2000).
95. Id.
96. Anthony Wanis-St. John, Implementing ADR in Transitioning States: Lessons
Learned from Practice, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 339, 340 (2000).
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peace."97 A comprehensive approach to judicial reform will include ADR in
one form or another.
There are a variety of ways that states implementing judicial reforms
can benefit from the concurrent implementation of ADR programs: ADR
programs address both the economic and democratic motives that underlie
judicial reform. Economic concerns are addressed by ADR because busi-
nesses prefer to utilize alternatives to litigation even when disputes arise in
countries with fully functioning, independent judiciaries. This tendency in-
creases when businesses have concerns about the predictability of a coun-
tries legal system. ADR can also address democratic development by divert-
ing certain types of disputes from the courts and reducing backlogs; ADR
can increase access to justice for individuals and groups that are disadvan-
taged; and ADR programs can reduce the cost of resolving disputes.98
Argentina is a leader in the fields of arbitration and mediation.9 The Ar-
gentinean government reacted to what it deemed a "judicial emergency" by
mandating compulsory mediation before any lawsuit, unless the case dealt
with family law."° Peru has had success in its Justice of the Peace program.
Lay Justices are able to arrive at equitable solutions that are amenable to the
parties without formal legal training.'' Costa Rica has also adopted some
forms of ADR. Compulsory arbitration is required for all insurance disputes
involving the Costa Rican National Insurance Institute. 02
2. Democratic Development
Recently Latin American courts have "abandon[ed], albeit slowly, their
traditional actions and are endeavoring to become aggressive protectors of
constitutional rule and of citizens' constitutional rights."'0 3 Costa Rica's ef-
forts include amending its Constitution and reorganizing its highest court. In
1989, law No. 7128 created the "Cuarta Sala" of the Supreme Court of Costa
Rica. This law was enacted to make it easier for the Supreme Court to ensure
compliance with the constitution.
The Cuarta Sala's Mandate was to "guarantee the supremacy of the
norms and constitutional principles, international law and community law in
force in the republic, their uniform interpretation and application like fun-
damental rights and freedoms consecrated in the constitution or in interna-
tional instruments in force in Costa Rica." The magistrates are to prevent
97. Dakolias, supra note 63, at 201.
98. Wanis-St. John, supra note 96, at 373. See also Dakolias, supra note 63, at 200.
99. Id. at 433.
100. Id.
101. Hans-Jurgen Brandt, The Justice of the Peace as an Alternative: Experiences with
Conciliation in Peru, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 92, 93-98
(Malcolm Rowat et al. eds., 1995).
102. Wanis-St. John, supra note 96, at 434.
103. Wilson & Handberg, supra note 88, at 523.
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abuses of legislative, executive, and bureaucratic powers, or the unconstitu-
tional acts of private individuals or any acts that prevent an individual from
exercising their basic rights as contained in the constitution.""°
The statute facilitated these objectives by changing the organization and
composition of the Supreme Court to allow it to more easily assert jurisdic-
tion over and decide cases involving constitutional questions.
Not only has the Supreme Court of Costa Rica taken a more active role
in protecting constitutional and individual rights, it has also taken several
steps to increase its caseload so as to provide better access to the judicial
process. "Improved access to justice is essential for providing basic services
to society, meeting the previously mentioned goals of democratization and
institutionalization, and redefining the relationship between society and the
state."'105
To further these ends, the Supreme Court has undertaken an extensive
informational campaign to educate individuals about their rights.0 6 Citizens
cannot bring a claim before the court asserting that their rights were violated
if they are not aware of what those rights are. Educating citizens of their
rights is as important a part of meaningful reforms as educating legal profes-
sionals:
Part of the initial intimidation of the judicial system is often the public's
lack of knowledge concerning how the system functions. Thus, public
education about the courts will increase the public's confidence and the
system's credibility. Some countries have implemented radio and televi-
sion programs to educate the public about the laws .... Once the public is
informed of their rights and the available legal services, the7 tend to be
more motivated to seek assistance to address their grievances.
As part of its campaign to educate the public, the Costa Rican govern-
ment has produced a variety of publications. These include an agenda con-
taining descriptions of governmental agencies and constitutionally guaran-
teed fights, a handbook for citizen participation, a version of the Costa Rican
Constitution directed at children, and a story directed at you which contains
information about your rights."8
Additionally, the Court has made it easier for individuals to file claims
with the Cuarta Sala."° Age and citizenship requirements have been elimi-
nated and the court receives petitions 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. " '
These provisions reflect the statement made by the leaders of Latin Ameri-
104. id. at 538.
105. Dakolias, supra note 63, at 199.
106. Wilson & Handberg, supra note 88, at 541.
107. Dakolias, supra note 63, at 223.
108. Comision Nacional para el Mejoramiento de la Administraci6n de Justicia, Agenda
2001 (Oscar Ar~valo et al. eds., 2001).
109. Wilson & Handberg, supra note 88, at 541.
110. Id.
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can States in the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, which said,
"[a] strong and diverse civil society, organized in various ways and sectors,
including individuals, the private sector, labor, political parties, academics
and other non-governmental actors and organizations, gives depth and dura-
bility to democracy. Similarly, a vigorous democracy requires broad par-
ticipation in public issues..'
Part of the participation in public issues includes individuals exercising
their rights and protecting those rights in the judiciary. By educating indi-
viduals about their rights and making it easier for anyone to instate a lawsuit
to protect those rights, Costa Rica is promoting the participation of all its
citizens in the democratic process. Teaching the populace about their rights
and the effects of reform are essential to ensuring the success of any attempt
at reform. These measures have allowed the judiciary to take steps to enforce
"guarantees of freedom of expression, assembly, suffrage, and worship"' as
well as constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto laws, arbitrary arrest, ex-
ile, torture, and capital punishment."'' 3
In addition to the efforts to educate the populace about their rights and
the various institutions that exist to protect those rights, the Costa Rican ju-
diciary is also taking steps to disseminate the results of judicial decisions.
Details of recent decisions as well as recently enacted laws and decrees can
be accessed without charge via the Internet."4 Providing access to decisions
promotes transparency in the judicial process. These efforts have a very de-
sirable effect:
Transparency and adequate dissemination of information to the public on
their activities and decision of the government branches contribute largely
to their political legitimacy. First, they provide an effective form of popu-
lar oversight for judges and judicial agents, deterring the judiciary from
violating due process and individual rights. Second, by bringing the com-
munity closer to judicial activities, they contribute to the promotion of
trust between the community and its judicial branch. Third, they discredit
the use of delay and censurable tactics by the parties in the handling of ju-
dicial processes. Fourth, they promote the education of the population
about judicial procedures and philosophies, enabling educated feedback by
the population on the performance of the bench, thereby removing the as-
sessment of judicial decision making from the exclusive domain of spe-
cialists. 15
Aggressive programs for constitutional education and legal principles
coupled with widespread dissemination of judicial developments lend a
sense of legitimacy to the judiciary.
111. Cooper, supra note 94, at I (quoting Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action,
34 I.L.M. 808, 817 (1995) (emphasis added)).
112. BIESANZ, supra note 38, at 179-80.
113. ld. at 180.
114. See, e.g., http:// www.poder-judical.gov.cr.
115. Garcia, supra note 27, at 1267.
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The Costa Rican judiciary has also made the criminal process more
transparent by revising their criminal procedure codes to include oral pro-
ceedings...6 "Oral procedures have allowed for public trials, which, in turn,
have helped make judges publicly accountable for their decisions.... "
Another important part of judicial reform is educating the legal profes-
sionals about the principles of the reforms:
The improvement of legal education is central to judicial reform. Legal
education and training for students, continuing legal education for practic-
ing lawyers, judicial training for judges and legal awareness education for
the public in particular should be emphasized. Legal education and train-
ing are important at every level, but must begin with fundamental changes
in the law schools."Y8
While reforms may initiate within the country at various levels, the pro-
fessionals who work within the judiciary on a daily basis will be the ones to
implement them. Judges or attorneys who have practiced under the status
quo for so long that a sense of complacency and comfort has resulted can
merely ignore much needed reforms. This inertia may make it difficult for
any significant changes to take effect.
Even those legal professionals who advocate for reform may be non-
plussed at the prospect of applying the changes in their practice. A practitio-
ner may find the skills acquired under the previous set of norms ill suited for
the implementation of new procedures. These difficulties must be taken into
account and provisions made for them if any judicial reform is to succeed.
The skills necessary under the new procedural framework (e.g.-oral argu-
mentation) must be identified and taught to practitioners so that they can
practire successfully. A systematic effort to provide continuing legal educa-
tion to both attorneys and judges is necessary to ensure that legal profession-
als are able to "keep abreast of legal changes and new areas of law."' 1 9
Additionally, care must be taken that existing schools of legal education
are teaching future professionals these skills. A legal or judicial education
should "include courses in general subjects that all judges [and attorneys]
need to master, subjects relating to specific duties (including court and case
management techniques) and new developments dealing with emerging ar-
eas of law and societal concerns.""'
One reason for the success of the Cuarta Sala and the other changes that
have been implemented in recent decades is the fact that the reform came
from within Costa Rica. In order to succeed reforms must be the "result of
local initiative and strong commitment."'21 The reforms must reflect the pri-
116. Dakolias, supra note 63, at 197.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 218.
119. Id. at221.
120. Id. at 219.
121. Id. at 230.
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orities of the country, taking into account its "political, social, cultural, and
economic" needs. '22 This is a change from the judicial reform programs of
the 1960s and 1970s. During that time, modernization attempts consisted of
importing wholesale the codes of more sophisticated nations as well as the
U.S. legal education system."' Little success came from those efforts be-
cause the programs were "often created by people with little or no knowl-
edge of these developing countries legal systems and even less knowledge of
their cultures." '124 It is impossible to develop a successful plan for reforms
without an intimate understanding of the existing system and the cultural
heritage that gave rise to the system.
The need for a first hand understanding of the cultural underpinnings of
the government and the judiciary also derives from treating another culture
with the respect it deserves. Any schematic for reform that is imposed upon
another country without due regard for the cultural identity of its citizens
will likely fail. A former president of Costa Rica said:
U.S. Policy makers have a serious problem: they do not know Latin Amer-
ica .... We Costa Ricans are good friends of the United States because we
have never been invaded. But the countries that have suffered the presence
of the Marines are not your friends. Why is Costa Rica the United States'
best friend in Latin America? Because you have never failed to respect
US. 125
The success of any attempt at reform depends upon recognizing and re-
specting the needs of the citizenry.
III. CONCLUSION
While Costa Rica faces many of the challenges that confront all of Latin
America, it has achieved a level of success in its judicial reforms that has
eluded many of its neighbors. This achievement can be attributed to aspects
of Costa Rica's development that are unique from the rest of the Latin
American community. Costa Rica has developed traditions of separation of
church and state, electoral integrity, free press, and individualism that have
allowed its reform attempts to succeed when similar attempts in other coun-
tries have failed. These unique attributes have been bolstered by the strong
support for reform within the Costa Rican legal system. Reforms have been
initiated in Costa Rica, and have had enough support within the legal system
to succeed. This combination of factors has permitted Costa Rica to effect
meaningful reforms while other Latin American countries have faced diffi-
culties implementing very similar programs.
Costa Rica's judiciary has earned a reputation for stability, integrity,
122. Id.at230-31.
123. Id. at 229-30.
124. Id. at 230.
125. ZARATE, supra note 67, at 53.
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and transparency in Latin America. Rather than rest on its laurels, Costa
Rica has recognized that importance of the judiciary to strong economic
growth and democratic ideals. Consequently, it has continued to strive to
improve its judiciary. Costa Rica has managed to avoid the pitfalls that have
beleaguered other nations in similar situations, and has taken meaningful
steps to remedy judicial deficiencies. Efforts continue to improve the effi-
ciency, independence and legitimacy of the judiciary. Additionally, aggres-
sive steps have been taken to educate every citizen about their right to judi-
cial recourse, and to ensure that professionals are well equipped with the
knowledge and skills necessary to effectively participate in the judicial proc-
ess.
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